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Casenote

New Car Emissions Feared to Increase
Global Temperatures, State Standing:
Massachusetts v. EPA

I.

INTRODUCTION

As debate over global warming continues to intensify, the United
States Supreme Court has taken steps to begin addressing the many
interests asserted by private and public parties. In Massachusetts v.
EPA,' the Court issued a landmark opinion that gives states the power
to assert their rights under the Clean Air Act2 in federal court.' The
Court also ruled that the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying a petition to promulgate a
rule establishing limits on new motor vehicle emissions of carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases ("GHGs") under the Clean Air Act.4 This
decision has centered the spotlight of the global warming debate on the
EPA and may result in the regulation of GHG emissions from many
sources other than just new cars.

1.
2.
3.
4.

127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
127 S. Ct. 1438.
Id. at 1463.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court began by noting, "A well-documented rise in global
temperatures has coincided with a significant increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Respected scientists believe
the two trends are related."' This phenomenon, known as global
warming, begins when carbon dioxide that has been released into the
atmosphere traps solar energy, resulting in a slower release of reflected
heat. This is similar to how the ceiling of a greenhouse functions, 6which
is why carbon dioxide is known as a "greenhouse gas" or "GHG."
On October 20, 1999, a collection of nineteen private organizations
filed a rulemaking petition with the EPA requesting the organization to
regulate emissions from new motor vehicles pursuant to section 202 of
the Clean Air Act.7 The group alleged that: (1) "1998 was the warmest
year on record"; (2) "carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and
hydrofluorocarbons" are GHGs; (3) "greenhouse gas emissions have
significantly accelerated climate change"; (4) "carbon dioxide remains the
most important contributor to [man-made] forcing of climate change";
and (5) "climate change will have serious adverse effects on human
health and the environment."8 The group also pointed out in the
petition that one EPA general counsel, prior to the time of the filing of
the request, concluded in a legal opinion that the EPA was within its
authority to regulate carbon dioxide, a sentiment that was later repeated
by his successor only two weeks before the filing.9
However, on September 8, 2003, the EPA denied the rulemaking
petition, claiming that the Clean Air Act did not empower the EPA to
enact "mandatory regulations to address global climate change."'0
Further, the EPA proclaimed that even if it had such authority, it would
be unwise to do so. The EPA maintained that the Clean Air Act did not
pertain to carbon dioxide, which is consistently concentrated in the
atmosphere, because carbon dioxide is not a local air pollutant." Also,
because of prior "political history," potential political repercussions, and
economic implications, the EPA concluded that the duty of enacting

5.

Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1446 (2007).

6. Id.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2000); Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1449.
8. Massachusettsv. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1449 (brackets in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

9. Id.
10. Id. at 1450.
11. Id.
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mandatory emissions limitations remained with Congress. 2 The EPA
also justified its denial of the petition because of the scientific community's failure to establish an unequivocal causal link between increased
global temperature and human activity. 3 Lastly, the EPA claimed that
a "piecemeal approach" to climate change, such as emissions limitations,
would conflict with the United States President's "comprehensive
approach to the problem." 4
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, the petitioners were joined by a number of state and
local governments. In a split decision of 2-1, the court of appeals ruled
against the petitioners, holding that the EPA properly used its discretion
in denying the rulemaking petition. In his opinion, Judge Randolph did
not present any concrete evaluation of the petitioners' standing to bring
the claim.' 5 Judge Sentelle, while concurring in the court's holding
that the EPA properly exercised its discretion, wrote separately to
reveal his belief that the petitioners failed to "'demonstrat[e] the element
of injury necessary to establish standing'" because they could not allege
"'particularized injuries"' as required by law." Conversely, Judge Tatel
concluded in his dissent that standing had been established by the
petitioners, arguing that the projected rise in sea level that could result
in substantial loss of coastal property was a "'far cry'" from an insufficient generalized harm. 7 Further, Judge Tatel argued that the
reduction in carbon dioxide emissions from American vehicles would
"'delay and moderate"' the consequences of global warming and therefore
sufficiently redress the petitioners' alleged injury."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 26,
2006,"9 and in a split decision of 5-4, ruled in favor of the petitioners. 20 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held that Massachusetts had appropriate standing, and with that threshold justiciability
issue satisfied, the Court could appropriately adjudicate the merits of the
case. 2 The majority determined that the EPA failed to provide a

12. Id.
13. Id. at 1451.
14. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

15. Id.
16. Id. at 1452 (brackets in original) (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 59-61
(2005) (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part and concurring in judgment)).
17. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 65 (Tatel, J., dissenting)).
18. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at
65 (Tatel, J., dissenting)).
19. Massachusetts v. EPA, 126 S. Ct. 2960, 2960 (2006).
20. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1463.
21. Id. at 1458.
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"reasoned explanation" for its refusal to act on the rulemaking petition.2 2 Therefore, the majority held that the decision was "'arbitrary,
capricious, ... or otherwise not in accordance with law.'"23 Chief
24
Justice Roberts, with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, dissented.
III.
A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Statutory Background

Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act 25 was enacted by Congress in
1970.26 Congress amended section 202(a)(1) in 1977,27 which currently states,
The [EPA] Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time
to time revise) in accordance with the provisions of this section,
standards applicable to the emission of any airpollutantfrom any class
or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which
in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipatedto endanger public health or welfare.28
This amendment was made in response to the Court's ruling in Ethyl
Corp. v. EPA,29 which held that the Clean Air Act and "common sense
demand regulatory action to prevent harm, even0 if the regulator is less
than certain that harm is otherwise inevitable."
The term "air pollutant" is defined by the Act as "any air pollution
agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical,
biological, radioactive ... substance or matter which is emitted into or
otherwise enters the ambient air.""1 Also, the term "welfare" is defined
to include "effects on ...weather... and climate."3 2
Since the enactment of the Clean Air Act, the concentration of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere has continued to rise, and the scientific
community has continued to progress in its understanding of the man-

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
791.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 1463.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) (2000)).
Id. at 1444.
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676.
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 401(d)(1), 91 Stat. 685,
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (emphasis added).
541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
Id. at 25.
42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000) (emphasis added).
42 U.S.C. § 7602(h).
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induced increase in global surface temperatures.3 3 However, it is
undisputed that some degree of uncertainty remains. 3'
Thus, in
deciding Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court engaged in a debate about
what degree of uncertainty is acceptable for establishing appropriate
standing.3 5 The Court, however, did not establish what degree of
uncertainty is generally acceptable.3 6
B.

Historically Significant Caselaw

1. Standing in General. Interpreting the standing requirement for
federal jurisdiction in Article III of the Constitution, the United States
Supreme Court held in Baker v. Carr37 that a petitioner must have
"such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination."3 The Court,
in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,39 further defined the holding in Baker
by requiring litigants who seek to invoke federal jurisdiction to establish
40
that they "have suffered an injury in fact" by proving two elements:
First, injury in fact requires the "invasion of a legally protected interest
which is ...concrete and particularized";4 and second, the injury must
be "'actual or imminent, not ... hypothetical.'"42 If injury in fact has
been established, there must also be causation (the injury must be
"'fairly .. .trace[able]"' to the conduct of the defendant) and redressability (it must
be likely "the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable
43
decision").
In Lujan, however, the Court established an exception to the general
standing requirement known as "procedural rights."44 Under this
exception, "[a] person who has been accorded a procedural right to
protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all

33. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1447-48 (2007).
34. Id. at 1463.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
38. Id. at 204.
39. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
40. Id. at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984)).
42. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S.
149, 155 (1990)).
43. Id. at 560-61 (alteration in original) (brackets in original) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976)).
44. Id. at 572 n.7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the normal standards for redressability and immediacy."45 More
importantly, as the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA4' noted, a litigant
with a procedural right has standing if there is merely "some possibility"
that the requested relief could persuade the adverse party to reconsider
Additionally, in a matter with
the allegedly harmful decision. 4'
multiple petitioners, the Court only requires one of the petitioners to
qualify for standing for the petition to be considered by the Court.48
2. State Standing. Over the past century, through a progression of
cases, the United States Supreme Court has established that sovereign
states are not normal litigants for the purpose of federal threshold
justiciability issues. 49 In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.," the State
of Georgia invoked federal jurisdiction to protect its citizens from out-ofstate pollution.5 ' The Court held that states are quasi-sovereign and
thus have an independent interest "in all the earth and air within [their]
domain[s]" that supports federal jurisdiction.52 Modern Supreme Court
cases, such as Alden v. Maine,5 3 which declared that the states "retain
the dignity, though
not the full authority, of sovereignty," have echoed
54
this sentiment.

In Missouri v. Illinois,55 the State of Missouri sought to invoke
federal jurisdiction for equitable relief from the potential injury that
could result if the Sanitary District of Chicago discharged raw sewage
into the Mississippi River.56 The Court held that states are permitted
to invoke federal jurisdiction when "substantial impairment of the health
and prosperity of the towns and cities of the state" is at stake.57 The
Court in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico,5" furthered this
holding by indicating that one factor for "determining whether an

45. Id.
46. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
47. Id. at 1453.
48. Id. at 1453-54 (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc.,
547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006)).
49. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico,
458 U.S. 592 (1982); Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper
Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
50. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
51. Id. at 236.
52. Id. at 237.
53. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
54. Id. at 715.
55. 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
56. Id. at 208-16.
57. Id. at 240-41.
58. 458 U.S. 592 (1982).
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alleged injury to the health and welfare of [a state's] citizens suffices to
give the [s]tate standing... is whether the injury is one that the [s]tate,
if it could, would likely attempt to address through its sovereign
lawmaking powers. " "
The Supreme Court has also specifically addressed the justiciability
issues of particularized harm and redressability for state injury claims.
In FEC v. Akins,"° the Court held that "where a harm is concrete,
though widely shared, the Court has found injury in fact."6 Regarding
redressability, the Court has held that an incremental remedy to the
alleged injury is sufficient for standing purposes.6 2 In Williamson v.
Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.,' the Court held, "[A] reform may take
one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which
seems most acute to the legislative mind."6 This is important for
states in addressing issues with widespread sources and effects, such as
pollution. The Court in Larson v. Valente65 went further, stating, "[A]
plaintiff satisfies the redressability requirement when he shows that a
need not
favorable decision will relieve a discrete injury to himself. He
6
show that a favorable decision will relieve his every injury."
IV. COURT'S RATIONALE

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 26,
20067 and, in a 5-4 opinion written by Justice Stevens, ruled in favor
of the petitioners. 6' The Court held that (1) the EPA's denial of the
petition to regulate new automobile GHG emissions presented a risk of
actual and imminent harm to Massachusetts; (2) the relief requested
was sufficiently likely to redress the actual and imminent harm claimed
by Massachusetts by reducing the extent of the injury; (3) the Clean Air
Act authorizes the EPA to regulate GHG emissions in the event it forms
a "judgment" that such emissions contribute to climate change; and (4)
once the EPA has responded to a petition for rulemaking, its reasons for
action or inaction must conform to the language of the authorizing

59. Id. at 607 (emphasis added).
60. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
61. Id. at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 243 n.15 (1982).
63. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
64. Id. at 489.
65. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
66. Id. at 243 n.15.
67. Massachusetts v. EPA, 126 S.Ct. 2960, 2960 (2006).
68. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1444, 1463 (2007).
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statute.6 9 As such, the Court granted states a special interest in
pursuing their claims in federal courts. 7° Additionally, the Court more
narrowly defined the scope of discretion granted to federal agencies
when they determine when to act under a federal statute.7 '
A.

The Majority
Justice Stevens concluded that Massachusetts (one of the petitioners)
had appropriate standing to dispute the denial of the rulemaking
7
petition pursuant to the Clean Air ActY.
The Court extended to
Massachusetts "special solicitude" to challenge the EPA's actions, ruling
that Congress had granted a procedural right under 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). 7 This allowed Massachusetts to assert its claim without meeting
74
all of the "'normal standards for redressability and immediacy.'"
Regarding the requirements of injury and redressability, the majority
held that the EPA's "steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both 'actual'
and 'imminent' " ' and that "[there is ... a 'substantial likelihood that
the ... relief requested' will prompt [the] EPA to take steps to reduce

that risk."76 The majority noted that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts owns a substantial amount of its coastal property, which would
bear hundreds of millions of dollars in damage from increased sea
levels.7 7 The Court also held that Massachusetts had shown sufficient
causation because both the EPA's failure to dispute the connection
between GHGs and global warming and its refusal to regulate GHGs
contributed to Massachusetts's injuries. 7' Further, the Court recognized that reducing new car emissions would contribute to slowing global
emissions. 7' The Court also held that Massachusetts had satisfied the

69. Id. at 1454-55, 1458, 1459-60, 1462.
70. Id. at 1454-55.
71.
72.

Id. at 1459-63.
Id. at 1454-55.

73. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2000).
74. Massachusettsv. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1453 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992)).
75. Id. at 1455 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
76. Id. at 1455 (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S.
59, 79 (1978)).

77. Id. at 1456.
78. Id. at 1457.
79. Id. at 1457-58.
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redressability requirement, noting that a plaintiff does not need to
"'show that a favorable decision will relieve his every injury.'"8"
After the threshold justiciability issues were satisfied, the Court
focused on the actions that lead to the suit-the EPA's refusal to
regulate GHGs under the Clean Air Act.8 ' The Court noted that
federal agencies have wide discretion over how to use their limited
resources to tackle agency responsibilities.8 2
Further, the Court,
relying on Heckler v. Chaney," commented that an agency's discretion84
is at its highest when choosing "not to bring an enforcement action."
The Court distinguished, however, between an agency's decision not to
initiate an enforcement action and the denial of a petition for rulemaking.8" The Court held that the Clean Air Act expressly permits
judicial review of a denial of a petition for rulemaking, 8 and the Court
"'may reverse any such action found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an
87
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.'"
Ultimately, the Court held that the statutory text of the Clean Air Act
unambiguously includes GHGs as air pollutants subject to EPA
regulation. 8 s Further, neither party disputed that GHGs (1) enter the
atmosphere and (2) contribute to its warming. 89
The Court rejected the EPA's reliance on FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.,9 ° in which the Court held that the regulation of tobacco
by the FDA would remove tobacco from commercial circulation and
would conflict with the "'common sense' intuition" that Congress
intended no such result.9
The Court held that EPA regulation of
emissions in the case at hand was distinguishable from the FDA
regulation in Brown because the EPA regulation would not result in the
removal of a product (automobiles) from circulation, as was the case in
Brown.92

80. Id. at 1458 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 243 n.15
(1982)).
81. Id. at 1459-63.
82. Id. at 1459; see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-45 (1984).
83. 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (holding that the refusal of an agency to initiate enforcement
proceedings is not normally subject to judicial review).
84. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1459.
85. Id.; see Am. Horse Prot. Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 3-4 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
86. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1459 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)).
87. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)).
88. Id. at 1460.
89. Id.
90. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
91. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1461 (quoting Brown, 529 U.S. at 133).
92. Id.
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The Court also held, in contrast to Brown, that the EPA failed to show
any congressional action that would conflict with EPA emissions
regulation. 3 The Court noted in addition that the EPA had not
previously denied the authority to regulate GHGs, but conversely, in
1998 the EPA asserted that it in fact had such authority.94 Further, the
Court denied the EPA's argument that the regulation of GHGs would
unlawfully overlap with the Department of Transportation's authority
to set mileage standards.9 5 Instead, the Court held that federal
overlap in their obligations and simultaneously avoid
agencies could
96
inconsistency.

The Court then addressed the EPA's alternative argument that even
if the EPA had the statutory authority to regulate GHGs, it would be
"unwise" to regulate GHGs at this time.9 v The majority, rejecting this
argument, held that the EPA was not permitted to consider factors
divorced from the statutory language, such as the "President's ability to
negotiate with ... developing nations" and the concern that the

approach would be "piecemeal."9 8 The Court restricted the EPA's
exercise of discretion to the statutory limits, ruling that subsequent to
responding to a rulemaking petition, the EPA's "reasons for action or
inaction must conform to the authorizing statute."9 9 The Court further
noted that the term "judgment" does not allow an agency to stray from
the authorizing statutory text. 100

Lastly, the majority rejected the EPA's argument that the level of
uncertainty concerning global warming precluded the EPA from
satisfying its obligation to regulate GHGs.10 1 Justice Stevens wrote
that the degree of uncertainty must be so "profound" that the EPA
cannot make a "reasoned judgment" that GHGs contribute to the global
climate change, and even then the EPA must make a statement to that
effect."12 Justice Stevens concluded that, pursuant to the Clean Air
Act, the EPA may avoid further action only if it is able either to
establish that GHGs do not add to climate change or to provide a
reasonable explanation about why it cannot or will not apply its

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1461-62.
at 1462.
at 1462-63 (internal quotation marks omitted).
at 1462.
at 1463.
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discretion to determine whether GHGs are contributing factors to
climate change. 3
B.

The Dissents
In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts conceded that global warming
"may be. . 'the most pressing environmental problem of our time,'" but
nonetheless argued that the petitioners' claims were nonjusticiable. °4
Specifically, Chief Justice Roberts disputed that the decision in Lujan
allows for the redress of an alleged injury by federal courts.10 He
argued that the majority approach had the effect of "[rielaxing Article III
standing requirements" for injuries asserted by a state and that the
majority failed to support its "special solicitude" rationale.' 6 Chief
Justice Roberts further stated that the sort of procedural right that the
majority upheld was insufficiently supported by the statutory text.0 7
Refusing to accept the caselaw relied upon by the majority, the Chief
Justice dismissed Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.' as outdated and
irrelevant and claimed that the case does not allow for an erosion of
Article III standing requirements. 10 9 In his interpretation, a state
asserting a claim as parens patriae"° must show that it represents the
members and also that at least one of the members satisfies the
traditional Article III standing requirements."' Chief Justice Roberts
argued that the State's claims of injury as a landowner were nonsovereign interests outside the realm of parenspatriae."2
Lastly, relying on Massachusetts v. Mellon"3 and Alfred L. Snapp &
Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico,"4 Chief Justice Roberts declared that a state
may assert a parens patriaeclaim for the protection of its citizens, but
the United States is the appropriate party to represent citizens when
enforcing rights with respect to a federal agency."' Furthermore, his
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1463-64 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Massachusettsv. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (No. 05-1120)).
105. Id. at 1464 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1464-65 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)).
108. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
109. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1465 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
110. Latin for "parent of his or her country"; his term refers to a state's role as a
'provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1144 (8th ed. 2004).
111. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1465-66 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 1466.
113. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
114. 458 U.S. 592 (1982).
115. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1466 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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dissent dismissed the petitioners' standing, claiming that across the
board, the facts of this case stretched the limits of standing further than
in any previous case." 6 Chief Justice Roberts characterized the injury
claimed by the petitioners as too widespread to be considered "particularized" or "imminent.""7 Causation, he claimed, was too speculative
and far too indirectly related to the injury."8 Redressability failed
because it was, according to Chief Justice Roberts, too insignificant to
avoid being overwhelmed by increasing global GHG emissions from other
sources
and too speculative to be considered satisfactory under Article
9
III.1"

Justice Scalia dissented separately to analyze the merits of the case.
In Justice Scalia's view, Massachusetts v. EPA was a "straightforward
administrative-law case." 20 He expressed his belief that despite the
importance of global warming, "[the] Court has no business substituting
its own desired
outcome for the reasoned judgment of the responsible
21
agency."'

Justice Scalia began by emphasizing that the EPA's authority to
regulate under the Clean Air Act is conditioned upon a judgment that
new vehicle emissions cause or contribute to air pollution that may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.' 22
Pointing out that Congress, when it wants to, knows how to force an
agency to act in a particular way, Justice Scalia argued that there is no
text within the Clean Air Act that requires the EPA to make a judgment
whenever a rulemaking petition is filed.' 23 Further, he rejected the
majority's ruling that the EPA's policy reasons for deferring to exercise
its judgment were divorced from the statutory text, stating that "the
statute says nothing at all about the reasons for which the [EPA] may
defer making a judgment," and therefore, the only thing to have been
divorced from was silence. 124 Further, according to Justice Scalia, the
EPA's interpretation of the Clean Air Act was reasonable, "the most
natural reading of the text," and was entitled to due deference under
125
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
Lastly, Justice Scalia argued that the current level of scientific

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1470-71.
at 1467-68.
at 1469-70.
at 1478 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
at
at
at
at

1471-72.
1472.
1473.
1473-74; 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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uncertainty26 concerning GHGs justified the EPA's decision not to form a
1
judgment.
Justice Scalia also disputed the majority's classification of carbon
dioxide as an "air pollutant" under the Clean Air Act, arguing that the
plain meaning of the statutory definition of air pollutant requires that
the substance be an impurity that enters the ambient air.127 Under
the majority's approach, Justice Scalia claimed that "everythingairborne,
from Frisbees to flatulence, qualifies as an 'air pollutant,'" and such an
interpretation, according to Justice Scalia, defies common sense. 128 In
summary, his opinion was that regulating the buildup of GHGs in the
atmosphere that induce climate change "is not akin to regulating
the
" 129
concentration of some substance that is polluting the air.
V.

IMPLICATIONS

While the Court's holding in Massachusetts v. EPA" ° appears to
invite a flood of global warming litigation, which has yet to occur, some
courts have interpreted it as establishing a limited framework for
evaluating global warming claims.' 3'
In September 2007, for example, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California provided some parameters for parties
seeking tort damages from injuries caused by global warming. In
California v. General Motors Corp.,132 the State of California sued
several automakers, including General Motors, Honda, Toyota, Nissan,
and Daimler Chrysler, for violations of federal and state public nuisance
codes.' 3 3
The State claimed that these automakers created and
contributed to global warming by producing "vehicles that emit ...
carbon dioxide," the primary cause of global warming.'3' Distinguishing itself from the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, the district court held
that such a claim would require the court to make the nonjusticiable
policy determination of what reasonable carbon dioxide emissions should
be." 5 The district court ruled that such an inquiry was a political
question that the courts were not authorized or equipped to adjudicate,

126. Massachusetts v.EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1474-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 1476-77.
128. Id. at 1476.
129. Id. at 1477.
130. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
131. See, e.g., California v. General Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL
2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
132. No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
133. Id. at *1.
134. Id.
135. Id. at *12.
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stating that "the authority to regulate carbon dioxide lies with the
federal government, and more specifically with the EPA as set forth in
the [Clean Air Act]," and "any [sitate that is dissatisfied with the federal
government's global warming policy determinations may exercise its
'procedural right' to advance its interests through administrative
channels and, if necessary, to 'challenge the rejection of its rulemaking
petition as arbitrary and capricious. ' " ' Although the procedural right
was available to Massachusetts in Massachusetts v. EPA, the district
court found it was not available to California against private companies,
and thus the claim failed. 13 7 The court granted the defendants' motion
to dismiss on the ground that the entire case raised nonjusticiable
political questions. 3 '
Additionally, there is a looming prospect of states adopting their own
regulatory schemes to restrict GHG emissions from motor vehicles. In
Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon,3 9 the petitioners
sought to enjoin enforcement of a California state regulation that
restricted new car emissions as GHGs. The petitioners argued that such
an act was preempted by 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) 140 (a portion of the Clean
Air Act).
The court noted,
California Health and Safety Code, section 43018.5 provides civil
penalties to manufacturers if emission standards are not met, provides
for the ability of manufacturers to credit current performance in excess
of standards to later performance shortfall, and enables a period of
time for manufacturers to offset early failures to meet standards with
later performance in excess of regulatory standards. 142
However, the court in Central Valley recognized that U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)
allows the EPA to grant California a waiver to impose stricter standards
than those imposed pursuant to the Clean Air Act, and should that
14
waiver be granted, other states may adopt California's standards.
The court stayed further proceedings pending the Supreme Court's
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, because if the EPA was held to have
authority to regulate GHGs, California could successfully apply for
waiver of federal preemption and establish state controls over GHG

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at *11 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (2000)).
Id. at *12.
Id. at *12-13.
No. CVF04-6663 AWILJO, 2007 WL 135688 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2007).
42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000).
Central Valley, 2007 WL 135688, at *1.
Id. at *2 (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 1961.1 (2007)).
Id.

2008]
emissions.'
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The Supreme Court's ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA,

granting the EPA the authority to regulate GHGs, appears to have
paved the way for other states to adopt California's stricter vehicle
emissions regulations, should waiver be granted.'4 5
Global warming has grown to become regarded as the single greatest
environmental threat to mankind. Movies such as An Inconvenient
Truth 46 have fought to bring the debate to the forefront of American
politics. Despite the outcomes of the discussed cases, the federal
judiciary has only begun to scratch the surface of litigation regarding
global warming. The Supreme Court's opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA
has succeeded in placing the spotlight on both Congress and the
EPA-hopefully signaling the end of the debate concerning mankind's
influence on the rise in global ambient air temperature and the
beginning of meaningful strides by the government to act upon this
threat.
NICK BISHER

144. Id. at *11, *15.
145. See David Shepardson, EPA: California, Other States Can't Impose Their Own
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